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Abstract
Looking back just the last several years it is easy to find the how the differences in EU economies could cause
problems in the future. The problems that were experienced during the curiency crises in Italy and Spain in
1992, where the countries had a dicult time keeping inflation rates on a low German level, and more
importantly the British currency crisis of 1993, are just a taste of the problems which will arise as the EMU
comes closer to reality (DeGrauwe, 1994).
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Britain at a Cross-road: The EMU Question 
John Gutowski 
In British politics today there is no more 
divisive issue than the European Union (EU), 
and more specifically, whether or not Britain 
should join the European Monetary Union 
(EMU). The EMU as put forth in the 
Maastrict Treaty is a three-stage process with 
the goal of leading the Member States down 
the path towards monetary union. To enable 
the passage of Maastrict through Parliament 
the British delegation fought for a provision in 
the treaty that would provide the UK with the 
ability to "opt-out" if it were decided that it 
was best for Britain to not join the EMU. The 
UK must, however, make this decision in 
1997. Ever since the passage of Miastrict the 
issue of whether Britain should join the EMU 
has divided both major political parties, even 
to the point where it is-threatenkg to break 
down the whipping system. The decision of 
whether or not to join the EMU is of supreme 
importance that d l  have ramifications well 
into the next century regardless of the final 
outcome. From an economic standpoint the 
only decision that can logically be made is that 
Britain must not join the EMU. 
There is a long list of economic reasons for 
why the UK should not join the EMU. The 
first of these is that the area designated for 
monetary union, the EU, is not an optimum 
currency area. An optimum currency area is 
simply the most efficient physical size for an 
area to have a common currency. If an area of 
monetary union is too small then it will not get 
all the benefits of having a single currency; if it 
h is too large then it encounter problems that stem fiom having a common currency (Copeland, 1994). The main problem--which C stems fiom having an area ofmonetary union that is too large--is that the economy within the common currency area can be so varied 
tl 
that different regions can be experiencing 
different economic cycles. Judging by this 
definition the EU is most definitely too large to 
be considered an optimum cwrency area. It is 
not hard to imagine that the industrial 
countries of Northern Europe could be 
experiencing very diierent economic 
conditions than the less economically 
developed countries of Southern Europe. 
The criteria to be considered an optimum 
currency area is admittedly tough, and it could 
easily be argued that by these standards the US 
could certainly not be considered one. Many 
people in hvor of the EMU point to the US as 
an example of a common currency area that, 
while too large to be considered an optimum 
currency area, is still thought of as being a 
success. This is a flawed argument however, 
because there are economic mechanisms at 
work in the US that allow it to overcome its 
size that are not present in the EU. 
The first economic mechanism that allows 
the US to be considered a successll common 
currency area is that in the US labor is mobile. 
The high mobility of labor in the US means 
that if one area of the country is experiencing 
an economic boom, while another is 
depressed, people can move fiom the 
depressed area to the booming area, thus 
helping balance out the economy as a whole. 
In the EU, however, labor tends to be much 
less mobile than in the US (Heathcoat-Amory, 
1996). This is due to a number of factors, 
including the that in most of Europe there 
tends to be a stronger attachment to the area 
where one was raised than in the US, the 
cultural differences between European 
countries are obviously much greater than 
those among the American states, many of the 
EU employment laws and standards are not yet 
M y  harrnonized-ofien mak q  finding a job in 
another EU country difficult, and finally the 
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language barrier that exists between the 
member countries. All of these factors 
combine to make labor less mobile, and 
therefore the EU a bad place for a common 
currency area. 
Another factor that the US enjoys that 
enables it to be a successful common currency 
area is that in the US large fiscal transfers are 
available to smooth out differences in its 
economy. These are made possible because of 
the strong central government in the US, and 
they are for the most part automatic. If one 
part of the economy is booming, then it will 
naturally produce more revenue for the 
government in the form ofhigher tax receipts. 
At the same time if another part of the 
economy is depressed, then the government 
will automatically put money into it through 
increased social payments (an increase in 
unemployment, welfare, etc.), and will often 
provide specific grants and programs to try to 
help the depressed area. The net effect ofthe 
fiscal transfers is that they tend to balance each 
other out, providing stability for the entire US 
economy. 
"The use ofmonetary policy 
as the governments' main 
economic tool would be lost 
if the UK joined the EMU." 
The EU is set up in such a fashion that its 
central government, while too strong for 
many, is not given enough power to tax and 
make fiscal transfers an effective way to deal 
with the fact that the EU is too large to be 
considered an optimum currency area. It has 
been estimated that for fiscal transfers to be 
effective the EU would need a minimum 
budget of 5-7% of Community GDP, 
compared with the current 1.2% of GDP 
which it receives today (MacDougall, 1992). 
An increase in the EU budget by such a degree 
is certainly not realistic in the near or even 
long-term future. Not only must the EU's 
budget be increased if the EMU is to succeed, 
but the central government of the EU, in 
particular the Council and Commission, must 
be given more power to tax as well as 
increased enforcement powers if an EU 
member is in arrears (DeGrauwe, 1994). 
Another important reason why the UK 
should not join the EMU is that by joining it 
would 1t>se control over its monetary policy. 
By its very nature the EMU will require the 
Member States to give up power over their 
own monetary policy, with decisions being 
made by a European Central Bank. The 
importance ofmonetary policy as an economic 
tool for the UK cannot be overstated. 
The major benefit ofmonetary policy that 
the UK would lose by joining the EMU would 
be the ability to control its interest rates. 
Control over interest rates is an important 
macroeconomic tool that is used by 
governments as a way to tty to smooth out the 
natural business cycle. If an economy is 
depressed the government can lower interest 
rates, which increases the money supply, 
causes an increase in demand, and hopefully 
creates an upturn in the economy. The 
converse is also true. If an economy is 
booming and inflation is starting to become a 
concern, a government can increase interest 
rates to "put the brakes" on an economy. 
Wh~n Margaret Thatcher took power in the 
late 1970s, she moved away from the 
traditional Keynesian approach of using 
government expenditures to smooth out the 
business cycle, which had been used in Britain 
from the Second World War onwards. She 
placed much greater emphasis on the use of 
monetary policy as the governments' main 
economic tool, a tool which would be lost if 
the UK joined the EMU. 
If the UK were to join the EMU, the UK 
would also lose the benefits which it receives 
from having a floating exchange rate. The fact 
that the pound is floating, as opposed to fixed 
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as it would be if the UK joined the EMU, has 
several advantages for the UK. If a country 
has a floating exchange rate, and is 
experiencing problems in its balance of 
payments account, the exchange rate will shift 
natudy to deal with the d&cit or surplus that 
is causing the problem. Floating exchange 
rates also have the added benefit of changing 
to keep pace with the changes in interest rates 
between trading partners. 
A final major problem with the EMU, and 
a reason for Britain to not join it, is perhaps 
the most obvious. It is simply that the 
economies of Europe, which the EMU is 
- attempting to bind together, are too diverse for 
a common currency. Britain's business cycle 
is just too different h m  the rest of Europe for 
a common currency to be in any way in the 
best interest of the UK. One has only to pick 
up a current newspaper to read how Britain 
has one of the most vibrant economies in the 
EU. The UK is even doing a lot better than 
many of the large industrialized countries in 
the EU. So while Britain is at a peak in its 
business cycle, the rest of EU, while not 
experiencing a depression, is certainly not at 
the same point. 
Looking back just the last several years it 
is easy to find the how the differences in EU 
economies could cause problems in the future. 
The problems that were experienced during 
W the curiency crises in Italy and Spain in 1992, where the countries had a dicult  time C 
keeping inflation rates on a low German level, 
and more importantly the British currency 
crisis of 1993, are just a taste of the problems 
which will arise as the EMU comes closer to 
reality (DeGrauwe, 1994). 
The British currency crisis of 1993 
provides an ideal example of why the UK 
should stay out of a common currency. In 
' 1 1993 the UK was still a member of the 
exchange rate mechanism IERM). where 
m&Ycountries tried to keed their exchange 1 rates within a fixed narrow band, and was 
experiencing a recession. Also at this time the 
1 ,- 
cost of German unification was causing 
inflationary pressures in Germany. This meant 
that the Bundesbank was using its monetary 
policy to fight inflation, at the same time 
Britain needed to use its monetary policy to 
stimulate the UK economy. Eventually the 
UK was forced to leave the ERM because of 
the pain caused by having to follow the 
monetary policy of the Bundesbank (high 
unemployment and a prolonged recession) was 
too great (DeGrauwe, 1994). While this is 
just one example, it shows perfectly how the 
differences in the EU economies make a pact 
like the EMU disastrous. 
When the EMU was being set out in the 
Maastrict treaty the authors realized that the 
differences in the economies of the member 
countries would be a major problem. Their 
solution to this problem was to set forth a list 
of common criteria for the Member States' 
economies, which all the EU countries had to 
work towards meeting, so their economies 
would be close enough for the EMU to be 
successfbl. These criteria are known as the 
"convergence criteria," and according to 
Maastrict must be met before the EMU is 
installed. The convergence criteria cover such 
economic areas as: inflation level, government 
budget deficit and debt level, and interest rates 
(GrEen and Pustag, 1996). The idea behind 
the convergence criteria is a good one. The 
problem is that as the 1999 deadline for the 
EMU approaches there is talk of letting 
countries join even though they don't meet the 
criteria or countries (such as France) using 
accounting tricks so they are able to meet the 
criteria. In both cases it totally defeats the 
purpose of the criteria, and if the EMU were 
to go forward without the Member countries 
meeting the convergence criteria their 
economies would be too different, creating a 
union that is destined for Mure. 
Proponents of the EMU tend to brush 
aside the economic costs that will be placed on 
Britain if it joins the EMU and logically focus 
on the many benefits they see that will be 
The Park Place Economist, v. 5 
accrued ifBritain were to join the EMU. 
The first and most often-cited argument by 
the Europhile in favor of the EMU is that it 
will lower transaction costs. While it is true 
that the EMU will lower transaction costs, 
these costs are so low that they in no way 
justify the loss of the benefits which Britain 
would enjoy by remaining out of the EMU 
(Heathcoat-Amory, 1996). In fact, as society 
becomes less dependent upon cash (with the 
increased use of credit cards and debit cards), 
these transaction costs will diminish. Another 
common argument in favor ofthe EMU is that 
it will promote price stability. This also is 
true, but in the UK. price stability has not been 
a problem for over a decade. The best way to 
promote price stability is though sensible 
government spending and sound economic 
management. 
The final often-cited economic reason in 
favor of the EMU is that it would reduce 
exchange rate uncertainty and risk, thus 
increasing investment and trade. When 
examined carefully this reason can also be 
shown to be unimportant, and in no way 
justifies the UK. joining the EMU. In the UK. 
most major businesses protect themselves from 
exchange rate risks through open market 
transactions on the currency market, and with 
its current system of a floating exchange rate 
the UK. does not have any problem attracting 
investment, receiving about 40% of the total 
investment coming into the EU. Another 
factor which must be taken into account is that 
halfofBritain's trade comes from outside the 
EU, which means that any help the EMU 
could give Britain in increasing trade and 
investment would be less than most other EU 
states whose economies are centered more on 
Europe. Overall the economic benefits if 
Britain were to join the EMU are very small, 
when viewed in relation to the costs. 
The UK is truly at an economic cross-road. 
It can decide to join the EMU out of fear of 
losing trade and influence in Europe, or it can 
take advantage ofits opt-out clause and refuse 
to join. In the former case the UK would be 
joining a common currency area which is not 
optimum and does not have the adjustment 
mechanisms to make up for this fact, would 
cause it to lose control over its monetary 
policy, and whose economic benefits are 
negligible compared to the costs. In the latter 
case, Britain could build its future on free 
trade and avoid a mistake which will bring 
misery to present and future generations. 
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